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WAIVER OF RIGHTS IN THE




F OR over two decades, the Supreme Court has tried to erect a doc-
trinal structure for station house confessions based on two conflict-
ing premises. The first premise, steadfastly insisted upon by the Court,
is that waiver of rights in the station house must meet the Johnson v.
Zerbst1 standard of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of a
constitutional right.2 Station house interrogations are the only proceed-
ings outside of the courtroom to which the Johnson v. Zerbst standard
for waiver of a constitutional right has been applied. Given that a judge
will not be present to help a suspect understand his rights and to ensure
that waivers meet the Johnson v. Zerbst standard, the situation a sus-
pect faces in the interrogation room is qualitatively different from what
it will be in the courtroom.
The second premise on which the Court has been equally insistent
is that the right to counsel under the sixth amendment is not triggered
by arrest or even by custodial interrogation, but attaches only when
"adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated" 3 against a suspect,
which, in most cases, is the suspect's first appearance in court.4 This
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author would like to express
his appreciation to Nathan Coats, Robert Nagel, Christopher Mueller, Marianne Wesson, and
Richard Collins for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (held that the federal court could not validly convict an alleged coun-
terfeiter, who was unable to hire counsel, unless the accused had under the facts and circum-
stances made a knowing, intelligent, and competent waiver of his sixth amendment right to
counsel).
2. Id. at 464-65.
3. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). In Kirby, the Court ruled that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel had not yet attached when the arrestee was identified by the victim in a
show-up at the station house following arrest but prior to the arrestec's first court appearance. Id.
at 684, 688-89.
4. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (sixth amendment attached when the arrestee
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initial appearance for advisement of rights by the judge and setting of
bail will normally take place shortly after arrest, but only after the
police have had a chance to interrogate the suspect. A constitutional
rule based on the Court's second premise leaves the suspect alone and
isolated in the interrogation room, armed only with the information
conveyed in the Miranda5 warnings, facing the decision whether to
waive his fifth amendment rights. According to Miranda, a suspect has
a fifth amendment right to counsel, but the suspect will need to go
against the wishes of his interrogators to assert his right to counsel
before interrogation ceases. Not surprisingly, many arrestees do not as-
sert their right to remain silent nor their right to have counsel present
at interrogation.6
Over the last few years, the tension between these two premises
has resulted in a series of disturbing decisions. Whether or not one
agrees with the results in the individual cases, taken together, they lead
one to believe that the Court has built a structure on a very shaky
foundation. The reasoning in these decisions is strained and unconvinc-
ing, and the opinions in the cases lead inevitably to a weak standard of
constitutional waiver for the station house, which is guaranteed to
was arraigned following his arrest on a warrant).
5. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that arrestees must be warned
of their rights under the fifth amendment. The litany of rights to be read by the police includes:
the right to silence, the right to have counsel present, the right to appointed counsel if indigent,
and the right to know that anything said can be used against him in a court of law. Id. at 479.
6. Two empirical studies of the effect of Miranda warnings conducted in the late 1960s in the
District of Columbia and in Pittsburgh found that roughly 40% of arrestees give statements to the
police. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1351-52 (1968); Seeburger & Wet-
tick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 1, 11 (1967).
The two studies have figured prominently in the debate over Miranda. Professor Caplan,
criticizing Miranda, relies on the Pittsburgh study because it suggests a drop in the confession
rate from 54.4% before Miranda to 37.5% after Miranda. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38
VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1464 (1985). In reply, Professor White argues that the Pittsburgh study is
the only one to find a significant decrease in the rate of confessions after Miranda was imple-
mented. He points out that the District of Columbia study concluded that Miranda had little
effect on the confession rate in Washington, D.C. See White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to
Professor Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1986). Those studies may even understate the
percentage of suspects giving statements to the police. More recent studies show tremendous vari-
ations in the rate of suspects making statements to the police, ranging from one-fourth to two-
thirds of the arrestees. See Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 127 (1986). Studies
in England have consistently found that from two-thirds to three-fourths of suspects questioned by
police made incriminating statements. Id. See also P. SontLEY. POLICE INTERROGATION: AN On-
SERVATIONAL STUDY IN FOUR POLICE STATioNs 21 (Home Office Research Study No. 61, 1980)
(Table 3.4).
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cause lo,'er courts considerable confusion in the years ahead. This
Article will focus on the theoretical and practical problems con-
straining the Court in cases involving waiver of constitutional rights in
station houses. It will also focus on the Court's attempt to wriggle its
way out of the predicament caused by these problems, which has re-
sulted in a series of decisions that pay lip service to the traditional stan-
dards of constitutional waiver but undercut those standards in practice.
The case that best demonstrates the Court's dilemma-insisting on
warnings about counsel, yet keeping counsel away from suspects-is
Moran v. Burbine,l which upheld a waiver despite the fact that the
police intentionally kept the arrestee in the dark about the fact that a
lawyer, alerted to the arrest by the suspect's family, was trying to
reach him in order to advise him. For the police to warn an arrestee of
his right to counsel and the availability of appointed counsel, but fail to
tell him that his counsel is trying to reach him, seems inconsistent. The
Court itself seemed uncomfortable with its decision and even reminded
state courts that they could reach a different conclusion as a matter of
state law.8 Not surprisingly, some state courts have done just thatY
For all of its inconsistency, though, Burbine is more a symptom of
the Court's problems than a cause. This Article will look closely at
three cases which, taken together, show dramatically the pressure the
Court has been under to redefine the notion of waiver of rights in the
interrogation room: Colorado v. Connelly, ° Colorado v. Spring,", and
Patterson v. Illinois.1 2 Connelly isolates the issue of voluntariness in
the Johnson v. Zerbst standard. Spring probes the meaning of a know-
ing and intelligent waiver under Johnson v. Zerbst when a suspect is
unsure of exactly which crimes the police wish to discuss in the interro-
gation room. Patterson raises the issue of the appropriate standard of
waiver in the interrogation room when the suspect's sixth amendment
rights have attached and the police desire to interrogate the suspect
7. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
8. Id. at 428.
9. See, e.g., People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr. 141 (1986)
(failure of police to inform detainee during questioning that his attorney had arrived at the station
house to speak to him invalidated the defendant's earlier waiver of the right to counsel and ren-
dered his confession during questioning inadmissible); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 537 A.2d
446 (1988) (failure of police to inform the defendant of counsel's efforts to contact him invalidates
earlier waiver of counsel unless state can show the defendant would not have invoked the right to
counsel if informed of the counsel's attempted contact).
10. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
11. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
12. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
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before he has had a chance to confer with counsel.
II. THE SOURCES OF THE PROBLEM
A. Johnson v. Zerbst in the Interrogation Room
In Miranda v. Arizona,"3 the Supreme Court suggested as a para-
digm the story of a suspect in custody who, because of the presence of
counsel at his elbow, was emboldened to tell his story to the police
freely and more accurately. The problem with this tale is that it is
largely myth. In reality, if a suspect does have a chance to consult with
counsel prior to interrogation, there will be no interrogation. If the case
against a suspect is weak, it would be a mistake to bolster the state's
case by answering questions. If the case against a suspect is strong,
caution still suggests silence so that the defense attorney at least has
some leverage left for plea bargaining. When one additionally considers
that a defense attorney at the time of the suspect's arrest may have
only an imperfect understanding of the evidence against a suspect or
the charges that eventually may be filed, a defense attorney always will
tell the suspect not to answer any questions from the police. By talking
to the police in such circumstances, there is everything to lose and
nothing to gain. Once a suspect makes a request for counsel, the police
understand the game is functionally over and there will be no
interrogation. 4
This creates a serious problem for a criminal justice system: if any
suspect informed by a competent defense attorney in the interrogation
room would be told that the smartest thing he or she could do would be
to make no statements to the police, how can any waiver by a suspect
in that setting be knowing and intelligent? The Court's insistence that
waiver in the station house must meet the standards of Johnson v.
Zerbst has always presented problems. A suspect hardly can be ex-
pected to make a knowing and intelligent decision about his constitu-
tional rights when he is alone in the station house, perhaps dealing with
13. 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
14. There may not even be a statutory mechanism for the appointment of fifth amendment
counsel in the interrogation room in some jurisdictions. Because there was no statutory mechanism
or system worked out for the appointment of fifth amendment counsel in the station house prior to
interrogation, the police in Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S. Ct. 2875 (1989), had added to the Mi-
randa warnings the following caveat: "We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be
appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court." Because the Miranda warnings have
a prophylactic purpose and are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution and because
the full set of warnings given Eagan "touched all of the bases required by Miranda," Id. at 2880,
the Court upheld the waiver despite the added language. Id. at 2881.
[Vol. 23:229
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the shock of arrest, worried about bail, and uninformed of the implica-
tions of his choices. While the Miranda warnings are an important pro-
tection against the compulsion inherent in the station house atmo-
sphere, they are limited in what they tell a suspect. The Miranda
warnings tell a suspect in custody that he has the right to remain silent,
but do not tell him of the trial or bail consequences if he insists on
remaining silent. The warnings also do not give a suspect the sort of
contextual information about the case that would necessarily inform a
decision whether to waive the right to counsel in the courtroom setting.
A suspect who is arrested may not understand the full range of charges
he faces. He will frequently have imperfect knowledge of the evidence
against him. There also may be collateral evidentiary confusions that
might lead a suspect to believe oral statements will not be admissible.1 5
Obviously, no set of warnings can clarify all these confusions. The fifth
amendment and the issues related to the fifth amendment are too so-
phisticated and complicated for many laypersons to understand, espe-
cially those who are trying at the same time to come to grips with a
sudden loss of liberty.
B. Attachment of the Right to Counsel at the Start of Adversarial
Judicial Proceedings, Shortly After Interrogation Has Concluded
The Court's insistence that the right to counsel under the sixth
amendment attaches shortly after arrest (but subsequent to interroga-
tion) has its own conceptual problems, independent of station house
waiver issues. The period shortly after arrest seems an arbitrary point
at which to afford indigent citizens the right to counsel. In many cases,
it is much too late to provide an arrestee with the skills that a good
lawyer can provide. For instance, in white collar prosecutions or other
complicated criminal investigations, the government is usually commit-
ted to prosecuting weeks or even months prior to "the initiation of ad-
versary judicial criminal proceedings.""6 "Targets" often will be aware
15. This may be what occurred in Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), where the
suspect told the police that he would not give any written statements to the police until his attor-
ney was present, but proceeded to talk with the police about the crime. The Court rejected Bar-
rett's contention that his expressed desire for counsel prior to giving a written statement was an
invocation of his right to counsel which should have required the police to cease interrogating him.
Id. at 529.
One study found that 45% of the suspects studied thought, despite having received Miranda
warnings, that oral statements could not be used against them. Leiken, Police Interrogation in
Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. LJ. 1, 15 (1970).
16. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
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of their status as targets well before the indictment is returned 17 and
many of the legal skirmishes that define the contours of the criminal
case will take place in the months prior to the return of an indict-
ment. 18 During this preindictment period, certain targets also will be
able to negotiate favorable plea bargains or other dispositions, which
may not be available or may be much less attractive once indictments
are returned. Obviously, a target armed with counsel will usually be in
a much better position to understand the ramifications of grand jury
proceedings and to negotiate and bargain in an effort to avoid or lessen
criminal liability than a target who cannot afford counsel. In compli-
cated cases, therefore, the sixth amendment right to counsel seems to
attach much too late. Consequently, in these cases, indigent defendants
are placed at a distinct disadvantage.
If, however, the right to counsel under the sixth amendment is
meant to attach at a point at which the "government has committed
itself to prosecute" and "the adverse positions of government and de-
fendant have solidified,"' 9 attachment of the sixth amendment right at
a defendant's first appearance in court is too early in many routine
criminal cases. Unlike white collar cases where the timing of a sus-
pect's arrest (and, hence, the triggering of the attachment of the sixth
amendment right to counsel) will be within the control of the prosecu-
tor, police dealing with ordinary street crimes-robberies, burglaries,
or rapes, for example-will often have little choice but to arrest the
suspect on the spot or else risk losing all possibility of solving the crime.
Consider, for example, a suspect whom airport security personnel find
in possession of drugs or contraband as he boards an aircraft. In such
circumstances, the authorities have little choice but to make the arrest
immediately. It may turn out that the items are not what they appear
to be, that they were planted on the suspect, or that others are involved
in a broader criminal plot which may take weeks to unravel. Whatever
the results of the later investigation, however, there is no time for in-
quiry prior to arrest. Furthermore, once a suspect is arrested, there is
also no choice but to bring the suspect in front of a judge shortly there-
17. While "target" warnings are not constitutionally required, see United States v. Washing-
ton, 431 U.S. 181, 189 (1977), Justice Department policy is to give warnings to targets. See 9
CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF'JUsTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL ch. 11, § 263
(June 15, 1984).
18. For a lively account of the preindictment skirmishing in a major criminal prosecution, see
J.B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 35-43 (1987) (discussing the McDonnell-Douglas bribery case).
19. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
[Vol. 23:229
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after,2" even though investigation is only at a preliminary stage. If at-
tachment of the sixth amendment is supposed to mark the end of police
inquiry and a commitment by the state to prosecute, a defendant's first
appearance does not in fact draw such a line. In many felony cases, the
investigation into the crime will then only be beginning and there will
be no commitment on the part of the state to prosecute the suspect
until much later. If the sixth amendment right to counsel is meant to
attach, as the Court tells us in Kirby, only when "the government has
committed itself to prosecute" and "the adverse positions of govern-
ment and defendant have solidified,"2" the logical point for attaching
the sixth amendment is the return of an indictment (or the filing of an
information) which turns an arrestee into a defendant and clearly indi-
cates the government's decision to prosecute. In contrast, when the sus-
pect first appears in court, the prosecutor will often not have had a
chance to talk to the arresting officer, to interview witnesses, or even to
evaluate the file.22
III. VOLUNTARY WAIVERS IN THE STATION HOUSE:
Colorado v. Connelly
A. The Background of the Decision
The Court's attempt to have it both ways-insisting that waiver in
the station house is to be evaluated by the strict standards of Johnson
v. Zerbst while trying to keep sixth amendment counsel out of the in-
terrogation room-has resulted in a string of cases that have plainly
been difficult for the Court to resolve. One of the stiffest challenges to
the Court's insisfence that the standard of waiver applicable in station
house interrogation be the same standard as that applied in the court-
room was Colorado v. Connelly.23 Connelly presented the Court with
dramatic facts that isolated the voluntariness issue for constitutional
waiver in the station house better than any hypothetical a law professor
could concoct.
20. While there is no constitutionally set time period within which a suspect must be brought
before a magistrate, state law generally requires that a suspect be brought before a magistrate
without unnecessary delay, which usually means within 24 hours after the arrest, or if the suspect
is arrested on a Friday, the following Monday. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL. 1 Cruiu-
NAL PRocEDuRE 21 (1984).
21. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
22. In many urban judicial districts less than 30% of all felony arrests will result in the filing
of an indictment or information. Y. KArMSAR, W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL. MODEN CIuiNAL PRo-
cEDtnR 17 (7th ed. 1990).
23. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
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The case arose on August 18, 1983, when Francis Connelly ap-
proached a police officer who was in uniform but working in an off-duty
capacity in downtown Denver and told the puzzled officer that he had
killed someone and wanted to talk about it.24 The officer immediately
advised Connelly of his Miranda rights.25 Connelly stated that he un-
derstood them but that he still wanted to talk about the murder.20 Con-
nelly told the officer that he had taken the life of a young female trav-
eling companion in November or December of 1982 and gave the
officer the general street location in west Denver where the killing had
taken place.
27
The officer telephoned the Denver Police Department. A detective
was dispatched to the scene to interview Connelly. After the detective
told him again of his Miranda rights, Connelly explained to the detec-
tive that he had just flown to Denver from Boston in order to confess to
the murder of Mary Ann Junta, a young girl whom he had killed in
Denver sometime during November of 1982.29 Connelly was taken to
police headquarters where a check of departmental records indicated
that the decomposed body of an unidentified female had been discov-
ered in April of 1983 in the general area described by Connelly. At
the station Connelly repeated his statement about the murder and indi-
cated that he would be glad to show the officers exactly where the kill-
ing had occurred.31 Connelly was placed in a police car and he directed
the officers to the area where the killing had taken place. 2
24. Id. at 160.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 725 (Colo. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
28. Id.
29. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 160 (1986).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 160-61. Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that there was no corroboration in the
record of Connelly's statements and that there was no finding that they were even reliable. Id. at
183. This argument is a bit misleading given that the trial court never got to the issue of reliabil-
ity because it ruled that due process would bar the statements in any case. There is another
reason, however, that the reliability of the statements was never raised in the record, even as a
part of the due process argument: there was overwhelming corroboration of the statements in the
police report. The police report shows that, through the use of dental records and the identification
of the clothes of the victim, the police were able to confirm that the victim was indeed Mary Ann
Junta, a 14-year-old runaway Indian girl. Denver Police Department, Police Report No. 826-269,
at 11-12 (copy on file with author). Interviews with some of Connelly's relatives in the Boston
area following Connelly's arrest also confirmed that the victim had been a companion of Con-
nelly's in late 1982. Id.
[Vol. 23:229
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Subsequent evidence revealed that Connelly had serious mental
problems. A psychiatrist employed at the state mental hospital testified
at a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress Connelly's statements to
the police3 that Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia
that manifested itself in "command hallucinations" 3' which interfered
with Connelly's "volitional abilities." ' The psychiatrist explained that
Connelly's mental disease caused him to begin to experience the "voice
of God," which had instructed Connelly to withdraw money from his
bank and to fly from Boston to Denver. -" When Connelly arrived in
Denver, the psychiatrist further explained, the voice became stronger
and it told Connelly either to confess his guilt to the police or to com-
mit suicide.37 Reluctantly following the command of the voices, Con-
nelly approached a police officer and confessed. The psychiatrist testi-
fied that Connelly's illness did not impair his cognitive abilities and,
thus, that Connelly understood his Miranda warnings, but the psychia-
trist concluded that Connelly's mental disease had impaired his voli-
tional capacity with the result that Connelly had no choice in deciding
whether or not to confess.
3 8
33. Connelly's attorney filed his motion to suppress prior to the preliminary hearing. Although
it decided to address the merits of the suppression motion, the Colorado Supreme Court expressed
its disapproval of the practice of filing a motion to suppress prior to a preliminary hearing. People
v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 726-27 (Colo. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 Us.
157 (1986). The court explained that such a practice threatens to disrupt the expeditious determi-
nation of probable cause and places considerable pressure on the defense and the prosecution,
which are often not ready to argue complicated issues of suppression within the rigid time restric-
tions required for holding preliminary hearings. Id.
34. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Ass'n at 21, Colorado v. Connelly. 479
U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660) ("[The term 'command hallucination' does not actually appear as
a recognized technical term.... The term is used, however, in published articles in the profes-
sional literature.... It refers to auditory hallucinations in which the recipients hear a voice or
voices commanding them to perform some action.").
35. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161 (1986).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The American Psychological Association (APA) in its amicus brief filed in Connelly
took strong exception to the testimony of the state psychiatrist at the suppression hearing who had
stated that although Connelly's chronic schizophrenia had not impaired his cognitive abilities, his
"command hallucinations" had impaired his "volitional abilities." Brief for Amicus Curiae Ameri-
can Psychological Ass'n at 3, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (No. 85-660). The APA
agreed with the psychiatrist's statement that Connelly's cognitive capacities were not impaired by
his schizophrenia, but argued that the psychiatrist was not testifying as a scientist when he
claimed that Connelly's command hallucinations impaired his volitional capacity. Id. at 25. The
APA argued that even if the psychiatrist had meant to testify simply that command hallucinations
are "coercive" in a statistical sense, such testimony is completely unsupported by the professional
literature and is contrary to clinical experience that strongly suggests that people who receive
1991]
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
The bizarre facts of Connelly raised difficult due process and fifth
amendment issues. On the one hand, Connelly himself approached the
police to confess. The police seem to have treated Connelly respectfully
and to have done nothing wrong during the questioning. Furthermore,
Connelly's statements enabled the police to solve an unsolved murder
case. On the other hand, the only expert testimony at the hearing em-
phatically stated that due to mental disease, Connelly could not help
but follow his inner voices and confess to the police.
The state supreme court suppressed all of Connelly's statements to
the police.89 The court ruled that Connelly's initial incriminating state-
ments to the police prior to his arrest had to be suppressed because
they were the involuntary manifestations of his mental disease and
their use at trial would violate Connelly's due process rights.40 The
court also ruled that, even though Connelly had been warned of his
right to remain silent at least twice and had indicated that he under-
stood his options, the statements he gave to the police after being taken
into custody were inadmissible because Connelly "was incapable of
making an intelligent and free decision with respect to his constitu-
tional right of silence. '41
B. The Decision in Connelly
In Connelly, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision on both the due process and
Miranda claims.42 The Court found the due process issue easier to re-
solve than the fifth amendment claim. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Rehnquist reviewed the history of the due process cases from
the Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi,43 to the pre-
sent. Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that in all of these cases,
which span a fifty year period, the focus of the Court's opinions had
command hallucinations do not obey them. Id. at 25-26. According to statistics in the APA brief,
clinical experience demonstrates that less than one percent of the people who receive command
hallucinations actually obey them and the brief suggested this percentage is likely to be even lower
for persons who receive command hallucinations instructing them to act in ways contrary to their
self-interest. Id. at 26.
39. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 726 (Colo. 1985), rev/d sub nom. Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
40. Id. at 728-29.
41. Id. at 729.
42. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). On the due process issue, the Court was split
7-2. On the Miranda waiver issue, though, the vote was 6-3.
43. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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always been on the "crucial element of police overreaching." 4 The
Chief Justice explained that while one's "mental condition is surely rel-
evant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examina-
tion of the confessant's mind can never conclude the due process in-
quiry." 45 He argued that even the two cases relied upon by Connelly-
Blackburn v. Alabama,46 which involved a defendant who was probably
insane, and Townsend v. Sain,4 which involved a defendant who had
been given a drug with truth-serum properties--could be harmonized
with the majority's position because police overreaching, in the form of
exploitation of those mental weaknesses, was central to those decisions.
The Court's due process analysis answered only the first part of
the problem, because many of Connelly's statements were obtained
after he was in custody. A more difficult question for the Court re-
mained: even if the admission of involuntary statements for which the
state has no causative responsibility does not violate due process, how
can a mentally ill defendant who, in the opinion of a psychiatric expert,
felt compelled to confess to the police be said to have voluntarily
waived his constitutional rights in conformity with the standards of
Johnson v. Zerbst?
The Court answered that question by narrowing the waiver inquiry
so that only state pressure on a suspect to confess was relevant to the
result. Having decided in the first part of the Connelly opinion that
voluntariness for purposes of due process required some state responsi-
bility for the involuntariness of the confession, it reached exactly the
same conclusion on the fifth amendment issue. The Court declared that
"the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psy-
chological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than offi-
cial coercion.' "48 The voluntariness of a waiver of the fifth amendment,
therefore, depends "on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free
choice' in any broader sense of the word.1'4" From these premises, the
Court concluded that Connelly's "perception of coercion flowing from
the 'voice of God,' however important or significant such a perception
may be in other disciplines, is a matter to which the United States
Constitution does not speak." 50
44. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163.
45. Id. at 165.
46. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
47. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
48. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Etstad, 470 U.S. 298. 305 (1985)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 170-71.
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C. The Implications of Connelly: Voluntariness in the Interrogation
Room Versus Voluntariness in the Courtroom
On the due process issue, the Court was on solid ground. As long
as a suspect is treated properly by the state, internal pressures to con-
fess or even external pressures from family or friends do not seem to
raise due process concerns, unless perhaps the statement to the police is
clearly unreliable.51 When the issue shifts from due process in the
treatment Connelly received from the police to the issue of whether
Connelly waived his fifth amendment rights voluntarily, however, both
internal pressures from mental disease and external pressures from
third parties seem directly relevant. To be free from state coercion to
confess is one thing; to make a voluntary choice to confess and a volun-
tary statement as a result of that voluntary choice is something else.
One suspects that the Court's approach to waiver in the station house
would never apply to a waiver of constitutional rights in the courthouse.
To understand the problem, consider a defendant who enters a guilty
plea. Imagine that the plea was entered because an accomplice had
extorted the plea by threatening to kill the defendant's child unless the
defendant entered the guilty plea and took sole responsibility for the
crime. If later the defendant seeks to have his plea of guilty set aside
and is able to prove the coercion he was under when he entered the
plea, there is no doubt that the plea would have to be set aside because
it was not voluntary, even though the state was not the source of the
unlawful pressure on the defendant.
As a standard of constitutional waiver, Connelly is deficient.
While it is possible that Connelly heralds a new standard for voluntari-
ness in assessing constitutional waiver either in the station house or in
the courtroom, it seems highly unlikely that the Court would uphold a
waiver in the courtroom that was involuntary as the result of mental
disease or was involuntary because it was the result of pressure or even
extortion by a third person. Instead, the Court in Connelly announced
a weaker standard of waiver for the interrogation setting. As long as
the confession is not the product of state overreaching, a waiver of Mi-
randa rights is voluntary even if it would not be a voluntary waiver in a
plea situation.
51. The Court made it clear that it was not ruling that Connelly's statements were admissible
nor was it denying the fact that statements by someone with Connelly's mental problems may be
unreliable. The Court did state, though, that this was a matter to be governed by the evidentiary
laws of the forum and not the due process clause. Id. at 167.
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IV. "KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT" WAIVERS IN THE STATION
HOUSE: Colorado v. Spring
A. The Background of the Decision
Just as Connelly raised questions about what it means to waive the
fifth amendment voluntarily in the station house, Colorado v. Spring2
raised questions about the other prongs of a Johnson v. Zerbst waiver,
namely, what level of understanding is required for a waiver to be truly
knowing and intelligent.
The facts in Spring are rather mundane compared with the amaz-
ing facts of Connelly, but for this reason, the case raised issues of
broader import. The case began on March 30, 1979, when undercover
agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) ar-
rested John Leroy Spring in Kansas City, Missouri, as he was in the
process of selling certain stolen firearms to them.03 The agents had re-
ceived a tip concerning Spring's illegal dealings in firearms from an
informant. The informant had, however, also told the agents that
Spring had admitted to him that he and a companion had killed a man
by the name of Donald Walker while the three men were on a hunting
trip in Colorado."
After his firearms arrest, Spring was advised of his Miranda rights
by the ATF agents at the scene of the arrest and was again advised of
his Miranda rights at the ATF office.0 5 There, Spring signed a written
form stating that he understood and waived his rights, and that he was
willing to make a statement and answer questions."' After questioning
him about the firearms transactions that led to his arrest, the agents
asked him if he had a criminal record. Spring told the officers he had a
juvenile record for shooting his aunt when he was ten years old. The
agents then asked Spring if he had ever shot anyone else. Spring
ducked his head and mumbled, "I shot another guy once."' 17 The agents
asked Spring if he had ever been to Colorado and Spring said no. The
agents then asked Spring whether he had shot a man named Walker in
Colorado and thrown his body down a snowbank. Spring ducked his
head again and said no.68 The interview then ended.0 9
52. 479 U.S. 564 (1987).
53. Id. at 566.
54. Id.







Two months later, on May 26, 1979, Colorado law enforcement
officials visited Spring while he was still in jail in Kansas City for the
firearms offenses. The officers gave Spring his Miranda warnings and
Spring stated he was willing to waive them. 0 The officers then told
Spring they wanted to talk to him about the Colorado homicide. Spring
indicated that he "wanted to get it off his chest." 61 In an hour-and-a-
half interview, Spring confessed to the Colorado murder and talked
freely about the killing. Based on the interview, the officers prepared a
written statement which Spring read, edited and signed.6
2
Spring was later convicted of first degree murder at a trial in
which Spring's May 26th statement was introduced in evidence. The
conviction was reversed on appeal because the Colorado Supreme
Court concluded that under the totality of the circumstances the waiver
prior to the March 30th statement was invalid because Spring was not
aware that the interrogation would cover the subject of the Colorado
homicide.63 While the March 30th statement was not introduced at the
murder trial, the conviction was reversed because the state had failed
to show that the May 26th statement was not the product of the prior
illegally obtained statement.
64
B. The Decision in Spring
The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 7-2 and ruled that
Spring's waiver of his rights prior to the interrogation of March 30th
was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 5 Regarding the vol-
untariness of the waiver, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, ar-
gued that on the facts before the Court, there could be "no doubt" that
Spring's decision to waive his fifth amendment privilege was voluntary
since there was not even an allegation that the police had submitted
Spring to any physical violence or other efforts calculated to break his
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 567-68.
63. People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865, 872-73 (Colo. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564 (1987).
64. After the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Spring, the Supreme Court decided Ore-
gon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), which held that a voluntary statement obtained in violation of
Miranda does not taint a later statement preceded by proper Miranda warnings. Because the
Elstad issue was not considered by the lower court, the Supreme Court refused to consider
whether Elstad might have provided an independent basis for admitting the May 26th statement.
Spring, 479 U.S. at 572 n.4.
65. 479 U.S. at 573-74.
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will.66
The issue of whether Spring's waiver of his Miranda rights was
knowing and intelligent was obviously tougher to decide. Although
Spring must have been surprised when the agents who had just arrested
him for a firearms violation switched gears during the interrogation and
asked him about a shooting that had taken place in another jurisdiction
at another time, the Court rejected the relevance of the suspect's as-
sumptions about the scope of interrogation to the issue of waiver.67 In
the absence of any "official trickery" by the agents, such as affirmative
misrepresentations concerning the scope of the interrogation, the Court
said a knowing and intelligent waiver does not require that a suspect be
aware of the subject of the interrogation.6" Quoting from Moran v.
Burbine, 9 the Court stated that a "valid waiver does not require that
an individual be informed of all information 'useful' in making his deci-
sion or all information that 'might ...affec[t] his decision to con-
fess.' ",70 The Court insisted that as long as Spring understood both that
he had the right to remain silent and that anything he said could be
used as evidence against him, additional information "could affect only
the wisdom of a Miranda waiver, not its essentially voluntary and
knowing nature."71 The Court concluded, therefore, that the failure of
the law enforcement officials to inform Spring of the subject matter of
the interrogation "could not affect Spring's decision to waive his Fifth
Amendment privilege in a constitutionally significant manner."7
2
C. The Implications of Spring: A Knowing and Intelligent Waiver
That Is Not Very Intelligent
There are strong practical reasons in favor of the outcome in
Spring, which makes a suspect's beliefs and expectations about the sub-
ject of the proposed interrogation irrelevant to the waiver issue. In the
interrogation room, conversations will often flow from one crime into
another and it would be difficult for a police officer to warn a suspect of
the scope of the contemplated interrogation. In a setting similar to that
in Spring, for example, one might well expect that the ATF agents
66. Id.
67. Id. at 576.
68. Id. at 574.
69. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). For a discussion of Burbine, see supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
70. Spring, 479 U.S. at 576 (quoting Burblne, 475 U.S. at 422).




might "fish" and ask Spring about other possible firearms offenses in
an effort to get a better idea of the extent of Spring's illegal firearms
business, the source or sources of Spring's illegal weapons, or any other
information demonstrating further criminal activity. Much the same
could be expected in drug crimes, burglaries and other high volume
crimes, where a fruitful interrogation may permit the police to get a
more complete picture of an arrestee's criminal past and possibly solve
a number of other crimes. It may also enable the police to arrest sup-
pliers and others who have played a role in the criminal undertakings
of the suspect.
Although it may be accurate to say, as does the majority opinion,
that more information "could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda
waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature, 73 it is harder
to claim that a suspect who waives his fifth amendment rights in igno-
rance of the broader context in which the waiver is being sought has
done so intelligently under the standard of Johnson v. Zerbst.4 The
Zerbst standard has its origins in courtroom waivers of rights, a situa-
tion in which the legal and factual context is clear, defendant's counsel
is present, and the defendant must be canvassed by a judge to make
sure that the waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. One who
claims to use the Zerbst standard without the additional protections
that a courtroom setting provides has weakened the constitutional stan-
dard considerably.
No lawyer whose advice was sought by a client facing a decision to
talk to a law enforcement agent, a private attorney, a grand jury, or
anyone else, could advise the client unless the lawyer had some infor-
mation about the scope of the inquiry. The Court's rejection of the rele-
vance of the suspect's assumptions about the subject of the interroga-
tion lowers the standards for constitutional waiver. To understand what
the Court is doing to the concept of waiver in the station house, imag-
ine that a suspect in the station house were asked, not about his fifth
amendment rights, but instead whether or not he would be willing to
waive his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. While the right to a
jury trial is likely to be better understood by a layperson than the fifth
amendment privilege, imagine further that the inquiring officer even
explained what a jury trial was to the suspect with a few warnings
about the function of jury trials. A waiver in that situation might well
73. Id.
74. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). For a summary of the Johnson v. Zerbst standard, see supra notes
1-2 and accompanying text.
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be voluntary in the sense that defendant is free to choose between a
jury trial or a nonjury trial. Such a waiver may even be knowing in the
limited sense that the defendant understands the difference between a
jury trial and a trial to a judge. Without knowledge of the exact
charges, the possible witnesses or the evidence to be presented, how-
ever, one might have thought, at least prior to Spring, that such a
waiver would not be intelligent under Johnson v. Zerbst if the suspect
has to make the waiver decision in ignorance of the broader factual
setting in which waiver is sought.
V. OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE DOUBLE STANDARD:
Patterson v. Illinois"G
A. The Background of the Decision
In contrast to the fifth amendment waivers that take place in the
station house, sixth amendment waivers of rights in the courtroom
seem to be evaluated by a much higher standard. In Faretta v. Califor-
nia," the Court held that a defendant has a right to self-representation,
but emphasized that waiver of counsel may only be accepted if the sus-
pect has been "made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.""'  While the Court did not give details concerning the
nature of the inquiry that is required prior to waiver of counsel at trial,
it did note in Faretta that the trial judge had warned Faretta "that he
thought it was a mistake not to accept the assistance of counsel."7 ,8 In
the wake of Faretta it is usually the case that prior to permitting a
defendant to waive counsel, a trial judge will try to discourage a de-
fendant from waiving counsel by raising for the defendant's considera-
tion the sorts of issues likely to arise in the particular case and empha-
sizing the importance of counsel in addressing such issues.7°
Because a decision to waive sixth amendment counsel is usually a
matter of grave concern to a trial judge, traditionally requiring careful
inquiry, it is not surprising that a line of cases from the Second Circuit
had concluded that the "waiver of Sixth Amendment rights must be
75. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
76. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
77. Id. at 835.
78. Id. at 835-36.
79. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice states that before accepting a waiver of counsel.
"the court should inquire whether the accused apprehends the nature of the charges, the offenses
included within them, the allowable punishments, possible defenses to the charges, and circum-
stances in mitigation thereof, among other factors." THE ABA STANDARDs rOR CRIMNAL JUs-
TicE § 5-7.2 (2d ed. 1980).
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measured by a 'higher standard' than are waivers of Fifth Amendment
rights."80 In order to meet the higher standard of waiver for the sixth
amendment, that court required, as part of its supervisory power, that
waivers of the sixth amendment right to have counsel present during
postindictment interrogation be preceded by a federal judicial officer's
explanation of the content and significance of this right.81
Having adopted, in cases such as Connelly and Spring, a standard
of waiver for the station house that seems considerably softer than the
standard usually applied for waivers that take place in the courtroom,
it was inevitable that the Court would have to face the next question:
what is the proper standard for waiver in the station house when the
suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel has attached? If the careful
standards for waiver announced in Faretta are applicable to the inter-
rogation room, then the Miranda warnings seem inadequate to the
task. But if the Miranda warnings are sufficient for a waiver of both
fifth and sixth amendment rights in the interrogation room, how can
Faretta be reconciled other than by approving a lesser standard of con-
stitutional waiver for the station house?
The case that raised the sixth amendment waiver issue in the
Court was Patterson v. Illinois.82 Patterson was a gang member in-
volved in two confrontations with a rival gang in the early morning
hours of August 21, 1983.83 The second confrontation left one person
dead. Following his arrest, Patterson waived his Miranda rights and
gave a statement concerning the initial fight, but denied knowing any-
thing about the second fight and the death of the victim.84 Two days
later, Patterson was indicted along with two other gang members for
the murder.85 When the officer who had originally interrogated Patter-
son went to move him from the "lockup" where he was being held tem-
porarily to the county jail, a conversation ensued. Patterson asked
which gang members had been indicted and began to protest the omis-
sion of a particular gang member, whom he claimed "did every-
80. United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1980). See also United States v.
Satterfield, 558 F.2d 655, 657 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Massimo, 432 F.2d 324, 327 (2d
Cir. 1970)(Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1022 (1971). See generally Note, Pro-
posed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 CoLUM. L. Rsv.
363 (1982).
81. Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1153.
82. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
83. Id. at 287.
84. Id. at 287-88.
85. Id. at 288.
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thing."86 Patterson then started to explain that there was a witness who
could corroborate his version of the events. At this point, the officer
gave Patterson Miranda warnings. Patterson signed the waiver form
and gave the officer a long statement detailing the role of each gang
member, including himself, in the murder.8 7 Later Patterson confessed
again, following warnings, in an interview with the prosecutor.88 A mo-
tion to suppress the two statements was denied and Patterson was con-
victed of murder.89
The short time between the commission of the crime and the in-
dictment in Patterson is unusual given the seriousness of the charge.
Patterson was indicted only three days after the murder had been com-
mitted and the indictment was obtained even before Patterson had been
brought into court for his initial appearance following arrest. The opin-
ion did not indicate why the prosecutor's office felt compelled to indict
so quickly when there must have been strands of the murder investiga-
tion still to be pursued. The result of the speedy indictment meant that
adversarial judicial proceedings had begun at a point at which, not only
had Patterson not had the indictment explained to him by a judge or
by his attorney, but Patterson had not even been brought before a mag-
istrate following his arrest two days earlier.90
B. The Decision in Patterson
Forced at last to resolve the tension surrounding the suggestion
that waiver in the station house is judged by much softer standards
than waiver in the courtroom, the Court began its waiver analysis by
rejecting the view that the sixth amendment right to counsel is more
important than the fifth amendment right to counsel and, thus, the
sixth amendment right to counsel requires a higher standard for waiver
than does the fifth amendment right to counsel.0 ' The Court stated that
it has never suggested that "one right is 'superior' or 'greater' than the
other," nor did the Court find "any support in our cases for the notion
that because a Sixth Amendment right may be involved, it is more dif-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 288-89.
89. Id. at 289.
90. Had Patterson been brought before a magistrate and had Patterson requested appointed
counsel, the authorities would not have been able to approach Patterson in order to try to interro-
gate him until his counsel was present. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
91. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 297-98; see also supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
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ficult to waive than the Fifth Amendment counterpart.19 2
While the Court concluded that there was no inherent distinction
between the fifth and sixth amendments for purposes of waiver, the
Court finessed the apparent differences in the standards being applied
in the courtroom and the station house by announcing that the sixth
amendment requires different standards of waiver from situation to sit-
uation.9 3 The Court explained that there is a spectrum for waiver of the
sixth amendment right to counsel and that the standards for its waiver
will vary depending on the nature of the hearing or proceeding at
which waiver is sought. 4 The type of warnings and the procedures that
should be required prior to waiver have to be assessed from a "prag-
matic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the par-
ticular proceeding and the dangers to the accused of proceeding with-
out counsel."195 Using its new "pragmatic" approach to waiver, the
Court placed at one end of the spectrum waiver of counsel prior to the
start of trial. Citing Faretta v. California,9" the Court concluded that
waiver in such situations must be obtained under "the most rigorous
restrictions on the information that must be conveyed to a defendant,
and the procedures that must be observed, before permitting him to
waive his right to counsel at trial. 19 7 At the other end of the spectrum,
the Court put postindictment photographic lineups where there is no
right to counsel at all and, thus, waiver is not an issue, even though the
sixth amendment has attached.98 In the Court's view postindictment
questioning falls somewhere in the middle of the spectrum: there is a
right to counsel and waiver of counsel is required but it is judged by
lesser standards than those applied in Faretta.9 9 Employing its new
pragmatic waiver approach, the Court concluded that the Miranda
warnings were sufficient for waiver of counsel in postindictment ques-
tioning. The Court reasoned that the role of counsel at such questioning
is "relatively limited and simple"100 and that once the police had told
Patterson that any statement he made could be used against him at
trial, which the Court referred to as "the ultimate adverse conse-
92. 487 U.S. at 297-98.
93. Id. at 298.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 422 U.S. 506 (1975). See also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
97. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 298.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 299.
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quence x"101 of a decision to talk with the police, Patterson had sufficient
information such that his waiver of counsel was knowing and
intelligent.
C. The Implications of Patterson: Many Standards of Waiver...
But Why A Lesser Standard in the Station House?
The Court's conclusion that waiver of sixth amendment rights var-
ies depending on the nature -of the proceeding for which waiver is
sought is not inherently implausible. There are issues and court pro-
ceedings where the guiding hand of counsel is much less important
than it is at trial. A bail hearing, a preliminary hearing, or even a
postindictment lineup at which a suspect has waived counsel is unlikely
to do very much to affect the ultimate determination of guilt or inno-
cence and, in the first two examples, a neutral magistrate is present to
assure fair treatment for the suspect. However, if the Court wants a
graduated scale that correlates the nature of the waiver with the strate-
gic importance and legal complexity of the proceeding, postindictment
interrogation should rank very high because, strategically, the presence
of counsel at such a proceeding is crucial to protecting the interests of
the defendant. A defendant who chooses to go it alone in the interroga-
tion room is almost always strengthening the prosecution's case against
him and making a serious tactical mistake.10 2 It is no accident that one
of the most famous quotations in Supreme Court history is Justice
Jackson's comment that when a client is faced with interrogation, "any
lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make
no statement to the police under any circumstances. 1 0 3 Separated
from counsel with only the Miranda warnings for guidance, a suspect
may not realize the overriding importance of the decision to talk to the
police. If the defendant does agree to talk to the police, it will likely
undercut any plea bargaining leverage the defendant may have had and
may well result in making the trial a formality or a guilty plea a neces-
sity. Asking criminal defense lawyers if it is more important to have a
lawyer at a preliminary hearing or at a trial produces an obvious re-
sponse. To ask whether it is more important to have an attorney pre-
sent at postindictment interrogation or at trial is a much more compli-
cated question. Because the impact of a statement made during a
101. Id. at 293.
102. See Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize
Miranda, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1826 (1987).
103. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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postindictment interrogation is so devastating to the defendant's trial
prospects, there is a sense in which it is more important for most de-
fendants to have counsel at interrogation than to have counsel available
later at trial. Perhaps a better way to put it is that there will usually be
no "real" trial if the defendant chooses to discuss his involvement in
the crime with the police.
104
The Court in Patterson described the role of counsel at postindict-
ment interrogation as "relatively limited and simple" compared to the
role of counsel at trial. ° This comparison, however, is oversimplified if
one thinks of the waiver decision in the interrogation room from the
point of view of the defendant. It is certainly true that at trial in a
criminal case, there are a host of evidentiary, constitutional, and tacti-
cal decisions which a layperson cannot be expected to understand.
These range from the art of selecting a jury, to laying the foundation
for admitting pieces of evidence, to helping a defendant weigh the pros
and cons of the decision whether to testify. The same constitutional
confusions, evidentiary misunderstandings, and tactical uncertainties,
though, bear on the decision whether or not to answer questions from
the police. A defendant without counsel present to explain the law may
believe that the failure to talk to the police will bar him from testifying
later at trial. He may believe that only oral statements corroborated by
written statements are admissible;106 or he may believe that the failure
to give a statement will serve as a basis for a denial of bail or prejudice
him in the eyes of the judge or jury. To say, as the Court does, that
telling a suspect that "anything he says can be used against him at
trial" gives the defendant sufficient information to knowingly and intel-
ligently waive counsel, ignores the range of confusions that may sur-
round this warning in a defendant's mind.
It appears that Patterson may not have been well argued by Pat-
terson's attorney. The opinion emphasizes that Patterson's attorney was
unable to suggest in oral argument "any meaningful additional infor-
mation that [Patterson] should have been, but was not, provided in ad-
vance of his decision to waive his right to counsel. 1 07 There are many
ways in which a defendant in Patterson's situation might have been
104. "Once a suspect confesses or incriminates herself in a statement to the police, the subse-
quent trial is often merely a formality; the suspect bears the almost impossible burden of coun-
tering the statement and establishing her innocence." Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1845 (citing
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 152, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
105. 487 U.S. at 299.
106. See Leiken, supra note 15, at 33.
107. 487 U.S. at 295.
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more fully advised of the consequences of the waiver of counsel. The
police might have been required to warn the suspect that it was proba-
bly a mistake to talk to the police prior to talking with an attorney, 0 8
or perhaps a warning to the defendant that most attorneys would ad-
vise someone in the defendant's position not to talk to the police. The
argument over warnings, though, presupposes that it was proper for the
police or the prosecutor to approach Patterson after the sixth amend-
ment right had attached. The Court could have decided that the state
should not be permitted to approach an indicted defendant to interro-
gate him until he has had a chance to read the indictment and a court
or an attorney has explained its significance and the nature and theory
of its charges. 109
Patterson guarantees that there are a number of interesting issues
ahead for the Court as it tries to explicate the standards for waiver of
the sixth amendment right to counsel in the station house. For exam-
ple, suppose that the police had gone to Patterson for purposes of inter-
rogating him, but had not told him that he had been indicted. Would
that render invalid the defendant's waiver of the sixth amendment right
to counsel, or would the Miranda warnings suffice for a valid waiver
under the authority of Patterson?'1 0 Or suppose that the officer seeking
to interrogate .Patterson had told Patterson that he was indicted, but
was unable to tell Patterson the crimes for which he had been indicted?
Suppose the officer simply refused to tell the suspect about the crimes
charged. Would waiver following Miranda warnings still suffice in
these situations?
We can safely predict the outcome of one issue: if Patterson's fam-
ily had reached an attorney to represent him in the interrogation room
and if the attorney tried to reach Patterson, the police must tell Patter-
son that counsel is trying to contact him or else Patterson's waiver of
his sixth amendment rights would not be valid. The reason we know the
answer to this situation is that the Court in Patterson dropped a foot-
note telling us that Moran v. Burbine"I would come out differently if
108. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
109. Prior to Patterson, the Second Circuit had required that waiver of the sixth amendment
right to counsel be preceded by explanation of that right by a judicial officer. See supra text
accompanying notes 80-81.
110. The Third Circuit has ruled that the failure to tell a suspect in custody that he has been
indicted prior to custodial interrogation does not invalidate the waiver of the sixth amendment.
See Riddick v. Edmiston, 894 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1990).
111. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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the sixth amendment had attached.112 The Court gives no explanation
of why this should be so and one could as easily argue that, given
Burbine, there should be no distinction between the fifth and sixth
amendment rights to counsel in the two cases. Why should the actions
of a defendant's family (or his family's financial ability to hire an at-
torney) bear on the validity or invalidity of the waiver in the interroga-
tion room? If the role of counsel at postindictment interrogation is "rel-
atively simple and limited""13 and if the defendant knows that he can
have counsel present, why is that not sufficient for a knowing and intel-
ligent waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel if it suffices for
waiver of the fifth amendment right to counsel? Because Patterson
seems so ad hoc in its reasoning, it is difficult to predict what the Court
will find important or unimportant for waiver purposes in the future.
VI. WAIVING RIGHTS IN THE STATION HOUSE: ROADS THE COURT
HAS NOT TAKEN
A. Warnings Without Waiver in the Station House
An important influence on the Court in Miranda was the English
system of police warnings that are a part of the Judges' Rules, 114 which
require a British police officer to tell a suspect that he was not required
to make a statement and that anything said could be used in evi-
dence." 5 Professor Richard Uviller explains that, "with a little reword-
ing and two added stanzas," the Judges' Rules were transformed into
the Miranda warnings." 6 Perhaps, in retrospect, it might have been
wiser for the Court to have adhered more closely to the English model:
in England, the warnings under the Judges' Rules function simply as
warnings and there is no requirement of waiver associated with the ob-
ligation to administer warnings."
Obviously, there is a constitutional aspect to interrogation in this
country that is not present in England. Even in this country, however,
not every confrontation between a suspect and the police directly af-
fecting a constitutional right is viewed by the Court as presenting a
112. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 n.9 (1988).
113. Id. at 299.
114. H. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 195 (1988).
115. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486-88 (1966).
116. H. UVILLER. supra note 114, at 195-96.
117. See Home Office Circular No. 89/1978, reprinted in THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES IN ENGLAND
AND WALES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURE 153-54 (1981). See Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is
It Better Than Ours?, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 507, 524-26 (1984); Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 49.
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waiver situation that is judged by the standards of Johnson v. Zerbst.
For instance, in the area of consent searches, the Court has required
that a detainee give consent voluntarily. The Court, though, has
stopped short of requiring that there be a warning or a waiver of fourth
amendment rights.1 8
A system of warnings without waiver may seem to undercut Mi-
randa, but that is not necessarily the case. It is not inconsistent to ar-
gue that the Miranda warnings are an important safeguard in the in-
terrogation room, and therefore are necessary given the custodial
nature of the confrontation and our concern for the reliability of con-
fessions. At the same time, one must be realistic about what the Mi-
randa warnings are able to achieve. The warnings provide important
assurance to a suspect that he will not be mistreated. They help make
clear to a suspect that, even though he is in the physical control of the
state, he has the option of whether to speak and his choice will be
respected. They do not, however, provide assurance that a waiver of the
fifth amendment privilege is knowing and intelligent if such a waiver is
to be judged by the standards applicable to waivers in the courtroom.
There are great differences, both intellectually and emotionally, be-
tween the situation in the interrogation room, where the suspect is
alone often with imperfect knowledge of what is occurring, and the sit-
uation in the courtroom, where defense counsel has had a chance to
explore with the defendant the consequences that may flow from waiver
of a constitutional right. These differences may be too great to expect
the Miranda warnings to turn the former situation into the latter. If we
have reached the stage where the Miranda warnings are prophylactic
measures, not themselves constitutionally required,' 19 might it not have
been better initially to have left the warnings simply as warnings rather
than to have tried to maintain a theory of constitutional waiver that
has forced the Court to bend the waiver doctrine to fit the station
house?
118. See Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Part of the Court's justification for
not requiring waiver of fourth amendment rights in the consent search situation is the trustworthi-
ness of the evidence obtained. Id. at 227-28.
119. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (confession made after Miranda warn-
ing need not be suppressed solely because the police had obtained an earlier voluntary, but un-
warned, admission); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (police's failure to advise defend-
ant of constitutional rights does not render defendant's testimony inadmissible).
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B. Making Counsel Readily Available Prior to Station House Inter-
rogation
The most frequently voiced alternative to the Court's dilemma
over waiver is not to move away from the constitutional standards for
the station house, but rather to put teeth into those standards by pro-
Viding arrestees an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to any in-
terrogation or any attempt to have the arrestee waive any constitutional
rights.120
Typical of the proposals to increase the presence of counsel in the
interrogation room is the suggestion that all arrestees be provided with
a nonwaivable opportunity to consult with counsel prior to interroga-
tion.12 1 This proposal would seem to require only a modest expenditure
of financial resources since interrogation usually takes place only a
short time prior to a suspect's initial appearance in court, when the
sixth amendment will attach in any event.1 22 The proponent of this no-
tion states that this would solve "the numerous problems associated
with Miranda."12 3
The problem with this proposal (and any proposal to put counsel
into the interrogation room prior to securing a waiver), however, is that
it "solves" the Miranda "problems" by eliminating most postarrest
confessions. As explained earlier,1 24 because there is nothing to gain by
answering police questions and much to lose, the percentage of suspects
providing statements to the police after arrest would most likely be very
small if counsel were provided prior to interrogation. In white collar
crimes, the loss of postarrest interrogation as an investigative tool
would be of little significance.1 25 In those cases the grand jury, not the
police, is the state's main investigative tool. Many white-collar suspects
are aware of their status as targets 26 and are sophisticated enough to
120. See, e.g., Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47
DEN. LJ. 1, 49 (1970); Lippman, Miranda v. Arizona, Twenty Years Later, 9 CRI M. JUST. J. 241,
288 (1987); Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1830.
121. Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1842.
122. See supra note 20 (discussing time within which a suspect must be brought into court).
123. See Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1842. To the extent that Miranda was driven by equal
protection concerns and attempted to put arrestees on an equal footing in the interrogation room,
a nonwaivable right to counsel in the interrogation room makes sense. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966). See also Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions
of American Criminal Procedure, in Y. KAMISAR. F. INBAU & T. ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
OUR TIME 19-36 (1965).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
126. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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understand the breadth of the privilege against self-incrimination or
are wealthy enough to have lawyers to explain it to them. Arrest in
those cases, like the timing of the indictment, will be in the hands of
the prosecution and there is usually no postarrest interrogation even
attempted in such cases.
The white collar crime example is only one model of investigation,
though, and it is not the model for the majority of crimes.27 Whether
the system would suffer too much in terms of the reliability and accu-
racy of its fact-finding procedures if postarrest confessions were effec-
tively eliminated is a difficult question to answer.2 8 If it is accurate
that the percentage of arrestees in felony cases that give statements to
the police is forty percent or even more,1 29 a sharp reduction in that
percentage to a singe digit would seem likely to have tremendous con-
sequences for the accuracy and efficiency of the criminal justice sys-
tem. 30 Therefore, the Court is under pressure to maintain the narrow
window of opportunity for station house confession that presently exists
between arrest and first appearance.
The Court is clearly worried about the impact on the criminal jus-
tice system of any expansion of the right to counsel under Miranda. In
Moran v. Burbine,13' one reason the Court gave for upholding the sus-
pect's waiver, despite the police's failure to tell him that a lawyer was
trying to reach him, was the Court's concern that expanding Miranda
would "work a substantial and ...inappropriate shift in the subtle
balance struck in [Miranda].' '"12 This concern may be overstated given
the narrow facts of Burbine,3 3 but it raises a question that needs to be
127. See supra text accompanying note 15.
128. One reason that it is difficult to know with precision the effects of any proposal aimed at
providing counsel after arrest is that one consequence unanticipated by those making such propos-
als is the likely burgeoning of the law dealing with questioning during forcible stops, because the
police are likely to prefer to question suspects prior to arrest if possible to avoid the obligation to
provide counsel once arrest takes place.
129. Authors on both sides of the debate over Miranda rely on studies suggesting that the
percentage of those giving statements to police is in the neighborhood of 40% or more. See supra
note 6.
130. The debate over the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule and its cost to the system is
likely to seem almost insignificant compared to any proposal that results in a drastic reduction in
the number of confessions obtained from arrestees. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), Justice White cited a study concluding that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule re-
sulted in the nonprosecution of between .6% and 2.35% of arrestees. Id. at 907 n.6.
131. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
132. Id. at 426.
133. Whether an equal protection analysis would allow the line drawn in Burbine to be main-
tained for long-a line that seems heavily to favor suspects whose families have the resources to
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addressed regarding the more sweeping proposals offered to "solve" the
Miranda mess, like the proposal to provide a nonwaivable right to
counsel prior to interrogation 3 4 or the proposal simply to abolish all
custodial interrogation. 35
C. Narrowing the Fifth Amendment in the Station House
If the Court is correct in its belief that the proper balance in our
criminal justice system between the state and the individual requires
some opportunity to question the suspect once there is probable cause,
then perhaps the problems that plague the Court in cases such as Con-
nelly, Spring, and Patterson stem not from application of the Johnson
v. Zerbst standard in the station house or the presence of counsel in the
interrogation room, but from the breadth that the Court has given to
the privilege against self-incrimination. Many countries recognize the
principle against self-incrimination but this country reads the privilege
more broadly than most. In civil law countries defendants have the
right to remain silent, although inquiries addressed directly to the de-
fendant from the judge during trial are not unusual. 136 Access to the
defendant as a source of evidence is much more limited in the Ameri-
can and English legal systems and consequently both systems have
come to rely heavily on police interrogation.
13 7
Over the years, some of this country's most influential judicial
scholars, including Walter Schaefer1 3 8 and Henry Friendly,139 have ar-
gued that the fifth amendment has been too broadly interpreted and
they have built upon a proposal put forward in 1932 by Professor Paul
Kauper.'40 Under the "Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model, 1 41 interroga-
tion would be removed from police control and put under the supervi-
hire counsel-seems doubtful.
134. See Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1842.
135. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial Confes-
sions, 68 N.C.L. REV. 69 (1989).
136. See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 526 (1973).
137. See Van Kessel, supra note 6, at 126.
138. See W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 79-81 (1967).
139. See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 713-16 (1968).
140. See Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MICH. L. REV. 1224 (1932).
141. The terminology is borrowed from an article by Professor Yale Kamisar discussing the
history of Professor Kauper's proposal and its evolution into what he refers to as the "Kaupcr-
Schaefer-Friendly model." See Kamisar, "Kauper's Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty
Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15 (1974).
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sion of a judicial officer. The suspect would be provided with counsel
and would be given a chance to consult with counsel prior to interroga-
tion. The suspect would be warned that he has the right to remain si-
lent, but he would also be warned that his refusal to answer questions
in front of the judicial officer could be brought out at trial.
Other common law countries have wrestled with the merits of pro-
posals that more or less follow the lines of the Kauper-Schaefer-
Friendly model. In 1972, a prestigious law reform committee in Eng-
land proposed that silence in the face of questioning be admissible
against a suspect at trial, but the proposal met strong opposition and
was never adopted by Parliament. 42 Recently, another government
committee in England has put forward a similar proposal and its fate is
uncertain. 43 Scotland, a country long distrustful of police interroga-
tion,144 has actually adopted a statute that comes close to the Kauper-
Schaefer-Friendly model.114 The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act
1975 provides for formal examination of a suspect by a prosecutor in
front of a judicial officer. The suspect may refuse to answer any ques-
tion but such refusal to answer may be commented upon at trial by the
prosecutor, the judge or any codefendant "in so far as the accused (or
any witness called on his behalf) in evidence avers something which
could have been stated appropriately in answer to that question. 1 4 a
Any proposal in this country patterned along the lines of the
Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model would face not only substantial legis-
lative hurdles, but also serious constitutional obstacles as well.147 Griffin
142. See Berger, The Self-Incrimination Debate, 5 Clubt. Jusr. 7, 9-10 (1990). There is, how-
ever, a major difference between the English proposals and the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model.
The latter proposal is aimed at ending back room interrogation by the police and putting all
questioning in front of a judicial officer. The English proposals do not contemplate judicial control
over interrogation but would allow silence in the face of police questioning, with no judicial super-
vision, to be used against the suspect.
143. Id. at 10, 39-41.
144. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court reported that "Scottish judicial decisions bar use in
evidence of most confessions obtained through police interrogation." 384 U.S. 436. 488 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
145. The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, § 20A, reprinted In K. EwNG & W. FiN-
IME, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN SCOTLAND: CASES AND MATERIALS 131-32 (1988). The statute permits
the prosecutor to ask the suspect about any statement the suspect has given the police, so it is
apparent that the statute does not contemplate that the judicial examination would entirely sup-
plant police interrogation. Id. at § (1)(b).
146. The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, § 20A(5), reprinted In L EwNVG & 'N
FINNE, supra note 145, at 132. Unlike the English proposals, see supra notes 142-43 and accom-
panying text, the statute is obviously intended to encourage judicial examination or suspects and
would not permit silence in the face of police questioning to be used against a suspect at trial.
147. Judges Schaefer and Friendly both assumed that a constitutional amendment might be
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v. California,48 which prohibits comment at trial on a defendant's fail-
ure to take the stand and testify, contains broad language condemna-
tory of the use of silence against a defendant149 and there is dicta in
Miranda indicating that the use of a suspect's refusal to answer ques-
tions during police interrogation would violate the privilege against
self-incrimination.150 On the other hand, former federal Judge Marvin
Frankel has argued that Griffin should be read as limited to police in-
terrogation, and not pertaining to the judicially supervised questioning
contemplated by the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly model. Judge Frankel
suggested that a court that understood the value of getting station
house interrogation out of the back room and out of police control,
might "sustain this rearrangement as more thoroughly consistent with
the fifth amendment privilege, and less conducive to genuinely unac-
ceptable coercion, than is the existing situation."1
VII. CONCLUSION
None of these alternatives for bridging the gap between theory
and reality in the interrogation room seem likely to be adopted. The
tremendous effort that the Court has devoted to redefining the stan-
dards for waiver in the station house in cases such as Connelly, Spring
and Patterson makes it unlikely that the Court at this late date would
separate the Miranda warnings from the need to establish waiver in the
station house. If the Court will not go backward to cut back on Mi-
randa, it will not go forward either to expand on it. Moran v.
Burbine'5 2 leaves no doubt that the Court will not broaden the right to
counsel under the fifth amendment in the interrogation room even
slightly. In addition, while the Court has never had to face directly the
constitutional issues presented by the Kauper-Schaefer-Friendly propo-
necessary in order to effectuate their proposals. See W. SCHAEFER, supra note 138, at 78;
Friendly, supra note 139, at 721-22.
148. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
149. "[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of justice'
which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitu-
tional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Id. at 614 (citations
omitted).
150. "In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exer-
cising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prose-
cution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the
face of accusation." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
151. See Frankel, From Private Fights Toward Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 516, 531
(1976). See also M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 99 (1980).
152. 475 U.S. 412 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
[Vol. 23:229
WAIVER OF RIGHTS IN THE INTERROGATION ROOM
sal, those proposals have been around for many years and there has
been no hint, at least not from the present Court,0 3 that it might be
prepared to rethink the scope of the fifth amendment.
The result is the strange bundle of uncomfortable compromises
which constitute the Miranda legacy. Among the more obvious: we in-
sist on a system of warnings because we are worried about the intimi-
dating effect that the custodial atmosphere has on a citizen, but we
ignore the fact that the same custodial pressures will encourage most
citizens to cooperate with the authorities by waiving those rights.'0 ' We
tell a suspect in custody that he has the right to remain silent, but we
do not tell him that his silence cannot be used against him at trial or
even as a basis for a denial of bail. We understand that an attorney is
important during interrogation and warn a suspect of that right, but we
do not tell him that there is a lawyer outside trying to reach him.1 5
We announce that a waiver of rights in the station house must be
knowing, intelligent and voluntary under Johnson v. Zerbst, but we end
up applying a softer standard in the station house. In short, the Court
wants very much to protect suspects in their exercise of constitutional
rights, but at the same time it worries about the consequences if too
many suspects exercise their constitutional right to remain silent in the
interrogation room.
There are areas of constitutional criminal procedure that are com-
plicated because the issues are inherently complex. There are also areas
of constitutional criminal procedure that are complex because the
Court has made them complicated. Station house interrogation is an
example of the latter. Building on premises that pull in different direc-
tions, the Court has erected an edifice for station house interrogation
that is inelegant and unstable, and one that continues to need struc-
tural repair.
153. Justice Powell once indicated in 1981 that he would have joined Justices Steuart and
White in dissent in Griffin had he been on the Court at the time Griffin was decided. See Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 305, 307 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). There may very well have been
sufficient votes on the Court at that time to overrule Griffin.
154. Justice White highlighted this inconsistency in his dissent in Miranda.
.But if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as "Where were
you last night?" without having his answer be a compelled one, how can the Court ever
accept his negative answer to the question whether he wants to consult his retained coun-
sel or counsel whom the court will appoint?
384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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